Why Maduro’s Capture Matters More Than You Think

A Predawn Operation in Caracas Just Turned Latin America into the U.S.–China Front Line

At roughly 2 a.m. local time on Saturday, January 3rd, helicopters descended on Caracas—the visible tip of an operation involving more than 150 aircraft—bombers, fighter jets, surveillance planes, and drones—launched from 20 bases across the Western Hemisphere. The helicopters carrying Delta Force commandos skimmed toward Venezuela at 100 feet above the water to avoid detection. U.S. Cyber Command disabled Venezuelan air defense systems. By 4:29 a.m., the helicopters were back over open water with Nicolás Maduro and his wife aboard.

The operation took only a few hours. But it had been months in the making—CIA teams tracking Maduro’s movements since August, weeks of rehearsals using a replica of his compound, a phone call from Trump one week earlier telling Maduro to surrender.

There's been plenty of debate about whether the operation was justified, whether Maduro deserved it, what it means for Venezuelan people. I'm not getting into that.

What I’m interested in is how this affects U.S.-China relations. Because when I was reading the news stories covering this, I was surprised how many of them didn’t mention the backstory—the context that makes Venezuela more than just another regime change operation.

The Chinese Connection

Less than 10 hours before Delta Force descended on that compound, Nicolás Maduro was hosting a high-level Chinese delegation at the presidential palace in Caracas.

The delegation included Qiu Xiaoqi, China’s special representative for Latin American affairs—essentially Xi Jinping’s personal envoy to the region. They discussed deepening the “strategic partnership” between China and Venezuela. They talked about building what Maduro called a “bright future for China-Venezuela relations.” The Chinese were there to discuss extending credit lines and potentially restructuring some of the massive debt Venezuela owes Beijing.

Those gathered finalized the partnership. Before dawn, U.S. helicopters arrived.

Think about it: President Trump allowed the Chinese delegation to land, to proceed with their meetings, to toast a future of Sino-Venezuelan partnership. Then, moments later, he snatched the prize from their grasp in the most dramatic way imaginable.

Who’s Running Venezuela Now?

There’s debate about who’s really running Venezuela now. You’ll hear some say the Chavistas—the loyalists of the Chavez–Maduro system—still control the country. But make no mistake: the U.S. is in charge in Venezuela right now.

On January 3rd, hours after the raid, Trump announced that the U.S. will “run the country” until a “safe, proper and judicious transition” can happen. He didn’t give a timeline. But he did mention plans to have U.S. companies develop Venezuela’s oil reserves.

Maduro's former vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, was sworn in as interim president. But she's not making independent decisions. The day after the raid, Trump issued her a direct threat: "If she doesn't do what's right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro."

By that same night, Rodríguez was calling for "cooperation" with the U.S.—a dramatic shift from her initial defiant response to the attack.

The opposition leader Maria Corina Machado—who won the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize and whose candidate appeared to win the 2024 presidential election before Maduro stole it—has been sidelined. Trump said she lacks the “respect” needed to lead Venezuela. He’s chosen to work with Rodríguez instead because she can control the security forces.

So yes, the Chavista regime is still physically in place—defense minister, interior minister, security apparatus—but they’re operating under American supervision with the explicit threat of military force if they step out of line.

Which brings us back to China—and what it just lost.

The Humiliation

Since 2007, China lent Venezuela over $60 billion, making Venezuela the single largest recipient of Chinese finance in Latin America. That was roughly half of all Chinese lending to the region during that period.

Now, the Chinese aren’t handing out charity. Those loans were collateralized by Venezuelan oil. China was essentially financing Venezuela’s government in exchange for guaranteed oil supply at discounted prices, paid for in advance. By late 2025, roughly 80% of Venezuela’s oil exports were flowing to China.

In one night, China lost control over collateral it had spent tens of billions building up.

When Trump announced Maduro's capture on Fox & Friends Saturday morning, hours after the raid, reporters asked about the Chinese delegation meeting with Maduro. The subtext was obvious: what about their oil? Trump brushed it off:

I have a very good relationship with Xi, and there's not going to be a problem. They're going to get oil.

What he didn't say: on whose terms. But it's obvious whose. The U.S. now effectively controls Venezuela's oil infrastructure. Trump wants American companies developing the fields. He's already announced 30-50 million barrels will flow to the U.S., not China. In other words, China went from buying 80% of Venezuela's exports at discounted prices paid in yuan, to buying whatever Washington permits.

But the oil was only part of it. Chinese companies had established mining operations in Bolivar State—at sites like Los Pijiguaos and Morichalito—extracting critical minerals shipped to China through Colombian ports (using incorrect tariff codes to avoid scrutiny). These operations were integrated directly with Venezuelan state security forces. Years of infrastructure, now under U.S. oversight.

Finally, Venezuela wasn’t just another investment for Beijing. It was a major Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project—China’s global infrastructure and investment program designed to expand Chinese influence through ports, roads, energy projects, and trade agreements across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Venezuela represented China’s deepest foothold in the Western Hemisphere.

Now it’s a humiliation visible to the entire world.

No Way Back

So, did Venezuela cause the collapse of US-China relations?

It didn’t. But it did guarantee there’s no way back.

You have to remember the context. We're talking about two global superpowers that have been at each other's throats for years. TikTok bans. Spy balloons. Taiwan. Trade wars. Cyber wars. And plenty more. (I've covered these in greater detail here.)

And since Trump's return in 2025, things have escalated in ways that make his first term look restrained by comparison.

The tariffs alone tell the story. They went from 10% in February to 145% by May. China hit back at 125%. Things got bad enough that both sides agreed to a temporary ceasefire. But even while they were supposedly talking peace, the provocations kept coming. In October, China announced sweeping new export controls on rare earths (I wrote about that here). And in December—weeks after achieving a tariff truce with Xi—the U.S. announced an $11 billion weapons sale to Taiwan. Then, on January 1st, China put full licensing controls on silver exports, gating 60-70% of global refining capacity (more here).

There seems to be no end to it. And here’s what guarantees the confrontation continues—and gets worse.

In December—just weeks before the Venezuela operation—the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy. It's not a long read—about 30 pages—so you can get through it in under an hour. But here's the part that matters: it explicitly prioritizes "hemispheric defense" and what Trump calls the "Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine." According to the document:

[The U.S.] will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.

Translation: China, get out of Latin America.

The problem? China’s already deeply embedded. For instance, they’ve invested roughly $80 billion in Brazil—the region’s largest economy—controlling ports, agricultural supply chains, and mining operations. They’re building railroads across Peru to connect to Brazil’s interior.

But it’s not just Brazil. In November 2024, Xi personally opened the $1.3 billion Port of Chancay in Peru—bypassing the Panama Canal and cutting shipping times to China by 10 days. They control lithium mines in Chile and Argentina, critical infrastructure in Ecuador and Nicaragua, and telecommunications networks across the region. They even operate surveillance facilities in Cuba—90 miles from Florida—monitoring U.S. military operations.

Trump’s National Security Strategy essentially declares war on this presence. Latin America, it makes clear, is off-limits to China.

But China isn’t leaving.

It has hundreds of billions already sunk into the region, supply chains running through multiple countries, and strategic infrastructure built over decades. Walking away isn’t an option.

All of which means the U.S. and China don’t need Taiwan to engage in what could become a full-blown conflict. The Western Hemisphere will be enough.

The two superpowers are on a collision course. And after Venezuela, there’s no way back.

Regards,

Lau Vegys

P.S. As global markets slowly wake up to a reality that's been building for years: the U.S. and China aren't competing anymore—they're in open conflict. And in that environment, hard assets—particularly ones China controls or could weaponize—aren't just portfolio diversifiers. They're must-haves. That's exactly why a good chunk of our Crisis Investing portfolio is focused on these stocks: precious metals, rare earth miners, and energy—most of which Doug Casey himself owns.